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Introduction
At the center of the large financial meltdown of the years 2007-2008 in the US was the banking system. As Reinhard and Rogoff (2009) and Gorton (2009 have demonstrated, the banking sector is often at the center of a financial crisis. Most crises have ended up as a meltdown of the banking sector, and the banking sector has usually exacerbated and amplified the crisis whatever origin it had. As shows, in the past, loan losses and bank runs where the conventional mechanisms by which the crises where triggered, but more recently, banking crises seem to be strongly related to adverse shocks in asset value losses and financial stress.
Important versions of such studies of the destabilizing effects of the banking sector were put foreward after the "great recession" of the years 2007-2009 in the US. 1 Not many of such studies can be found for Europe. 2 It is of great interest now whether such adverse feedback movements could currently also occur to the European banking system. We want to study how this destabilizing mechanisms might work in a model of a banking-macro link and apply this to an EU Data set that is now made available from IMF (2011). 3 For the US there were recent studies that work with the financial accelerator to capture the financial-real linkage, but the destabilizing dynamics is not sufficiently captured in those models.
Also, so far the financial accelerator theory has mainly been applied to firms and households.
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) have shown that the financial market can have amplifying effects. Yet, in the DSGE tradition there is only a locally magnifying effect, through collaterals. Collateral value rises at high level of economic activity, making credit available and cheap, and the reverse happens at low level of economic activity.
Technically, the models are solved through local linearizations about a unique and stable steady state, and the amplifying effects occur only with respect to deviations from the steady state.
Also, mostly no debt dynamics is tracked. 4 The departure from the steady state is eventually mean reverting. Although the economy is accelerating, it will revert back to the steady state. Empirically, this is often shown in a one-regime VAR, see Gilchrist et al. (2009 Gilchrist et al. ( , 2010 , Christensen and Dib (2008) , and Del Negro et al. (2010) .
As the meltdown of the years 2007-8 has demonstrated, shocks to banks seem to be destabilizing rather then mean reverting. 5 . 2 An interesting recent paper is Monnin and Jakipii (2010) , who work with a distance of default model to study the instability of banking for selected EU countries.
3 See the IMF's (2011) Financial Stability Index (FSI). 4 Empirically the debt to asset value ratio is predicted to fall in the boom and rise in recessions.This is for example empirically stated in Gilchrist et al. ( 2009) . Yet, as Geanakoplos (2010) mentions, the empirical measure is distorted through the way the debt asset ratio is measured, namely as total assets over equity. Equity value rises in the boom and falls in a recession. A model of the interaction of asset prices and leveraging is presented by Semmler and Bernard (2011) . 5 Many students of the great depression developed the perception that locally destabilizing effects, arising Brunnermeier and Pederson (2009) , that show that banks often have to liquidate their capital, when asset prices get depressed and margin requirements in the money market rise, which forces the financial intermediaries to take a hair cut and to delever further, with another subsequent fall of asset prices reinforcing the downward trajectory. This has started new research on financial instability putting asset prices and their volatility at the center. 6 Models attempting to capture such mechanisms often stress that the falling asset prices, generate by fire sales of assets by some intermediaries, have external effects on the financial industry. The possibility of a downward spiral then comes from interconnectedness, interlinkages and contagion.
Such studies have started with Greenwald and Stiglitz (1996) and continued with Adrian et al.
(2010), , Geanakoplos (2010) , Geanakoplos and Farmer (2009) , and Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2010, 2011) . Those papers argue that this dynamics will create an endogenous generated jump in risk which is usually triggered by large changes in asset price movements.
This process primarily works through the balance sheets of banks. Banks, in the first instance, may have loan losses. 7 This may be arising from default of the firm or household sector, the foreign sector or resulting from sovereign debt. On the other hand, large shocks to asset prices and financial stress will affect banks -the asset and liability side of their balance sheets -reducing the availability of credit. As the financial stress rises, so will the risk premia, repo rates, the Ted spreads and credit spreads. These spillover effects to other intermediaries (as well as firms and
households) creates what BS (2010) call endogenous risk. Following BS (2010), in a dynamic
model of the banking sector, we show that such an unstable dynamics on the downside is likely to occur.
As to the empirics of such unstable dynamic one would expect that it is regime dependent: There will be high financial stress and a rise of credit spreads in a period of low economic activity, but low financial stress and narrow credit spreads in a period of high economic activity. To explore this instability empirically, we use a Financial Stress Index (FSI) recently provided by the IMF (2011). 8 The FSI by the IMF is available for a large number of EU countries and the US. We will use this data set for the empirical part of our study.
In our model and empirical work on the banking-macro link, we refer less to asset prices and their volatility, as BS (2010, 2011) , in constructing the downward destabilizing but to the movement of risk premia and credit spreads to explore the downward instability. We can justify our focus on those measures of financial stress, since in theoretical as well as empirical studies it has been
shown that factors such as large asset price falls, rising volatility, higher risk premia, and a run into liquidity are highly correlated with movements in discount rates. The different factors driving discount rates -and through that asset prices -are extensively discussed in Cochrane (2011).
Yet, as we also will show the triggering of the downward instability also depends on the constraints that are set for the banking sector, for example, on their asset accumulation and payouts, affecting risk taking, equity formation and leveraging of the banks. Higher payoffs, for instance, may encourage more risk taking and risk transfer, generating eventually higher aggregate risk and risk premia to be paid by all. So we will explore the behavior of our dynamic model for different constraints on the banks decision variables.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 builds up a model that reflects the above features. Section 3 solves numerically some model variants using dynamic programming. Section 4 discusses the quality of empirical variables to capture the interaction of banking financial stress and real output. Section 5 presents the MRVAR estimation procedure and reports the impulse-response studies for VAR as well MRVAR for EU countries and the USA.
Section 6 concludes the paper. The appendix describes our procedures and presents in detail the multi-country results.
The Banking Model and its Dynamics
Next, let us present the above developed ideas in a more formal model, which is closely related to the BS model (2010). We build this model on the balance sheets of the financial intermediaries.
Basic Model
We are introducing a basic model, akin to the model by BS (2010), by referring to the balance sheets of the banks. On the left hand side of table there are assets, valued at current asset prices.
On the right hand side there is debt d t and net worth n t =p t k t -d t .
The equity might be divided up into inside equity α(p t k t −d t ) and outside equity
The latter may be state dependent.
Next we introduce the dynamics of the variables. The asset price, the capital stock and the debt may evolve as defined in equs (1)-(3). dp t = µ t p t dt + σ t p t dZ t 
In BS (2010) the growth rate of asset prices in equ.
(1) follows a geometric Brownian motion, but it is affected by time varying volatility, σ t , for example as a result of rapid sales of assets.
As mentioned, instead of using asset price movements and volatility we employ risk premia and credit spreads to capture those effects. 9 Assets of the financial intermediaries in equ. (2) will be increased by investment, i t /k t , the function ϕ(i t /k t ) includes some adjustment cost which is concave in the argument, and δ is a depreciation rate of assets. 10 The actual gross capital of the bank increases at the rate i t /k t .
The debt evolves at a rate that is determined by the excess spending of investment over capital income, which is defined here as ak t . Investment in equ. (2) will increase the stock of assets for financial intermediaries, but the high rate of purchase of assets will also increase their debt, once the investment spending exceeds their income. The interest rate to be paid on debt, r t , includes a risk premium reflecting asset price shocks and financial stress of banks. It will be made endogenous being state or time depending risk premium. Note that only Equations (1) and (2) are stochastic.
So far we have neglected payouts, bonus payments for executives, which can be viewed to serve the consumption stream of the executives. 11 We can define the payouts as an optimal consumption stream. We can also have the investment being computed as optimal, with g t = i t /k t . Then we have a dynamic decision problem such as:
The latter model includes now payouts, c t , which is used for a consumption stream. 12 The future 9 As mentioned above, in empirical studies it is shown that large asset price falls, rising volatility, higher risk premia as well as higher discount rates are highly correlated. The relationship of those are discussed in Cochrane (2011) . 10 In their recent version, Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2011) write a model with capital assets, that could be banking capital or real capital. The model is equivalent of there is perfect substitution among them.
11 In Semmler and Bernard (2011) bonus payments of the six largest US investment banks are computed. Bonus payment, as a percent of revenues, went up from roughly 10 percent in 2000 to 35 percent in 2007. 12 In recent attempts of financial market reforms in Europe the cash payment of bonus payments is planned payouts are discounted at a rate ρ. Note that we have here g t = i t /k t . Note also that in equ.
(3) if the excess of spending for new assets and payouts exceeds the income generated, then the debt of the financial intermediary will rise. 13 We want to remark that the above is a standard model of wealth management, now commonly used to study wealth management of financial institutions, see He and Krishnamurthy (2008 
Herebyc t is the new control variable. 18 Termc t is the consumption wealth ratio, c k . The expression τ (g t ) represents a convex adjustment cost which is affecting the size of borrowing to achieve a growth rate g t . This is modeled by following the capital adjustment cost literature.
Yet, of course only the growth of wealth g t appears in the equation for the evolution of assets k t . The other expressions in equ. (6) are straight forward derivations from the negative of the growth rate of the debt-asset ratio as stated above.
to be restricted to 20 percent of total bonus payments, the remaining part is only allowed to be paid out in subsequent years via common stocks. In our model we leave aside those complications. 13 As mentioned before, for the problem of a social planner, which is equivalent to a monopoly problem of the financial intermediary, the prices are endogenous and do not play an additional role at first, see BS (2010) 14 See for example Hall (2010) who also includes an equation for the evolution of debt. Note that recently, as also BS (2010) are arguing, financial intermediaries have been encouraged by more risk taking through transfer of risk to outside investors, for example through CDO's and consequently the financial intermediaries will build up their debt -thus their default risk -more. 15 Note that we use stocks of assets and debt, in contrast to Geanokoplos (2010) who uses flows as leverage measure, hereby then leveraging is highly positively correlated with booms. 16 See BS (2010) 17 For a similar approach, see BS (2010) and Hall (2010) . 18 A derivation of a dynamic equation in the stochastic case, using Itoh's lemma, is given in BS (2010). The term σ 2 comes in through Ito's lemma.
Some Specifications
Next we undertake some specifications of the basic model that may help to highlight the inherent amplification mechanisms. A first type of specification pertains to the impact of financial stress on the banks decisions, in particular to role risk premia or credit spreads, banks are facing.
BS (2010) provide basic proofs of the probability of instability with endogenous asset prices. 19 Though, at first sight, one might look at asset price volatility but what actual might magnify the downward spiral, is the financial stress and credit spreads that the capital market requires. 20 A first simple way to capture such varying credit spreads is to introduce state dependent credit spreads, determined by leverage ratios. We make credit spreads a function of leveraging, but this will be a bounded function, with a floor and ceiling. The floor will be a risk free interest rate, and the ceiling will be given by an upper bound. 21 We take take for the credit spread
The arctan function above avoids the extreme instabilities arising in the asset price leveraging dynamics as might be implied in Geanokoplos and BS (2010), and it makes the credit spreads depending on leveraging ω t . Here the spread is made endogenous but it has bounds. Banks face credit spreads, but the impact on the debt dynamics is initially low, and then rising with leverage. We thus have that the decisions on consumption and asset growth are depending on state dependent credit spreads that the financial intermediaries are exposed to. 22 This will be built into our DP solution algorithm presented in Appendix 1.
Yet, as above mentioned, there are other factors affecting financial stress and risk premia, due to externalities and contagion effects from asset price movements. 23 So, the alternative is to 19 Here, the role of heterogeneous expectations and trading strategies for market price movements could be explored as well, as in Chiarella et al. (2009: chs 6-9 ). This could be related then to risk premia and credit spreads. There could also be more general effects such as liquidity problems, fire sales of assets and market dysfunctions, all giving rise to higher risk premia, see Geneva Report (2009). The rising volatility has also been included by numerous the financial stress indices developed by the KCFSI and the IMF FSI, to be discussed in sect. 4, where it is as own to affect credit spreads. Volatility is also relevant in a distance to default model where it is shown that the distance to default shrinks with rising volatility, and thus the risk premia rises, see Semmler (2011, ch. 19) , and Bonnin et al (2010) . 20 Furthermore, it is very likely that positive and negative asset price shocks may have asymmetric effects. This is also discussed in Basel III. BS (2010) have studied also the effect of a rising volatility σt on the spread. 21 See Beja and Goldman (1980) , and for a recent use see Chiarella et al. (2002) , and Chiarella (2009, ch. 6 and 8, where extensions to heterogeneous agents and the stochastic case are provided. 22 Since the publication of the financial accelerator principle by Bernanke et al (1999) the economists have been greatly concerned with the fact that borrowing cost moves counter-cyclically, and the ease of lending standards pro-cyclically. Accordingly, we have proposed a state dependent risk premium r(ωt). The risk premium, and thus the credit spread, is hereby made state dependent thus r(ωt) rises with the leveraging. If the involved parameters are appropriately chosen, the risk premium goes to zero and a constant (risk free) interest rate will re-emerge. The constant interest rate, as assumed in some version of BS (2010), is a limit case of the above scenario. For a model with a state dependent risk premium, see Gruene et al. (2004) . 23 
Formally, our stochastic dynamic decision problem will then have two decision variables and three state variables, the leverage ratio ω t , the time index x t and the stochastic term dZ t in the above variant, with r t time varying. Details of the estimation are discussed in appendix 2.
Another type of specification pertains to constraints on decision variables, for example on payoffs, resulting in consumption stream,c t . We could assume that payoffs are be constrained by some financial market regulation; for example, if the net worth, as a ratio of net worth to total assets, falls below a certain safe threshold, then the payouts could be reduced. Equivalently we could postulate that if the debt to asset ratio moves below some threshold, lets say
, then the payouts are decreased or set to zero. It could hold that the payouts are used to give the managers an incentive to reduce leverage, so when the leverage is lower, a higher payouts payments could be allowed. 26 This might be considered as a penalty on risk taking and high leveraging -the former resulting from leveraged asset purchases. 27 The dynamics of the debt-wealth ratio, once those constraints on decision variables are introduced, are likely to change. 28 the macro risk in one indicator using principle component analysis. 26 This is for example planned by Basil III, where it refers to "linkages of the total variable compensation pool to the need ...to maintain a sound capital base" 27 A a further issue might be that the financial intermediaries have in fact transferred risk to outside investors through securitization, i.e. through pooling and tranching of mortgage debt or other kind of liabilities, through MBSs or CDOs. Successfully undertaking the transfer of risk encourages them to take on more risk, but passes the verification cost on to someone else. The verification cost usually defines the amount that financial intermediaries have to pay, but if it is passed on, they can generally borrow at a lower risk premium, see BS (2010: sect. 4) for details of such considerations. Higher bonus payouts may encourage more risk taking and risk transfer, generating eventually higher aggregate risk and greater risk premia. 28 One could consider a further modification that takes into account the availability of funds for the financial
Solution Method and Numerical Results
As BS (2010), the dynamics for a model such as represented by equs. (5)- (6) should not be studied by common linearization techniques. The first or even second order Taylor approximations to solve for the local dynamics of a model such as (2)- (3) or (5)- (6) will not properly capture the global instabilities of the model in particular in some regions of the state space. We have used the dynamic programming method by Gruene and Semmler (2004) to study the dynamics of the stochastic version of the model (5)- (6). Here, the debt to asset ratio is the state variable, and the control variables are the growth rate of assets and payouts for consumption, for which we will introduce constraints, and we will use state dependent and time dependent credit spreads as specified in sect. 2.2.
Solution Method and Model Variants
When we use a dynamic programming method to explore the local and global dynamics we use a coarse grid for a larger region of the state space, and then employing grid refinement for smaller region. The DP in the appendix 1 can provide us with information on the truly global dynamics in a larger region of the state space without losing much accuracy (see Becker et al., 2007) . When we study the basic model variants we explore the stability properties of each variant.
When state dependent credit spreads is defined as a function of leveraging, ω t we define the risk premia and credit spreads as
as mentioned, the arctan function above, with κ > 0, avoids the extreme instabilities arising in the asset price leveraging dynamics as might be implied in Geanokoplos (2010) and BS (2010).
We restrict our considerations here to the simplest case, as in equ (10), where the bank pays a risk premium formulated in a simple way 29 which is built into our DP algorithm.
The alternative is to introduce a time varying credit spread which is detailed in appendix 2.
We take here the case of Germany and proxy the time varying risk credit spread by the IMF intermediaries. There might be a fraction of households that accumulate risky assets, which will provide funds for the financial intermediaries. A fraction of funds could also come from capital inflows, see Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2009) . In this context, the inflow of funds from the Central Bank could be considered, which for example took place in the US in the years 2008 and 2010 when the Fed employed an unconventional monetary policy, called quantitative easing, buying bad -and rapidly declining -assets from the financial intermediaries.
The ECB provision of a three year low interest rate liquidity for the EU banks in December 2011 is a similar case. This has a mitigating effect on the unstable forces generated by the banking system. An estimation of this effect will be presented in section 5. On the other hand, the precautionary motives of households (and firms), the "run into high quality assets", would lead to a reduction of financial funds for the financial intermediaries. 29 As mentioned above, we use the same arctan function-type for the risk premium. This has a lower limit, the risk free rate, and an upper limit. The upper limit of a premium charged is justified, since, as Stiglitz has always argued, with higher default premia, the lender might have loan losses at greater credit spreads.
(2012) FSI. 30 which by and large reflects the varying risk premia. We estimate low frequency components of the credit spreads by:
Note that the first two terms in the above equation represent a constant and time trend of credit cost, the next terms are the low frequency components. Appendix 2 reports how many periodic components are needed to properly proxy the actual time series of the credit spread and the coefficients of equ. (11) .
As to the payouts 31 , we introduce alternatively broader and narrower constraints, which will, however, always be non-negative. 32 When we define the payouts for,c t , we let the choice to be taken from and interval:c min <c t <c max . So, the payout is always positive but is constrained. 33 For the case of less constrained payouts we assume 0.01 <c t < 0.3 and for constrained payoffs, we assume that 0.01 <c t < 0.05. As concerning the asset growth we constrain the growth of assets to −0.1 < g t < 0.1.
State-dependent Credit Spreads
We here report the results of the state-dependent credit spread and larger interval for payoffs.
As to the parametrization of our model we take: a = 0.25 , α = 0.3, σ = 0.008 , and γ = 0.03
and ρ = 0.03. Figure 1 shows on the horizontal axis the state variable ω and on the vertical axis the stochastic shocks to the state variable ω. Since we have stochastic shocks, with pre-defined standard deviation σ = 0.008, the path of ω varies in the state space, and thus there is no unidirectional vector field, i.e. the path of ω t is not a straight line. In our numerical procedure the shocks are drawn from a distribution having a pre-defined standard deviations σ = 0.008. As visible from the numerical solution path in Figure 1a , there is an unstable steady state roughly about a low 30 Note that the major components of the financial stress indices of the IMF (2011) FSI as well as the KCFSI, and the STLFSI, are variables that are capturing risk premia and thus credit spreads. 31 As to the constraints on the the growth rate of assets (or certain types of assets) acquired by the banks, those are probably hard to constrain, unless there are borrowing constraints introduced as Geanokoplos (2010) seems to suggest. So we have used here rather broad constraints for the growth rate of assets. 34 In other words small initial leveraging will eventually end up at low level of debt to asset ratio, because the credit spread is low, but larger leveraging -a shock that moves the leverage above ω * = −0.85 makes both the leveraging as well as the credit spread rising, a vicious cycle: higher leverage creates higher credit spreads and higher credit spreads results in higher leveraging. 35 On the other hand, there is a small domain of attraction: if the financial intermediary starts with low leveraging and low credit spread, both may be reduced further.
It is the debt to asset ratio, and its accompanying credit spread, as well as the payouts, that are amplifying. Thus, under those conditions a leveraging ratio beyond a threshold, is likely to be dynamically unstable, as BS (2010) predict. 36 
Time-depending Credit Spreads
Next we consider time dependent credit spreads but also tighter constraints on payouts. BS (2010:32) state that allowing the debt to asset ratio rise too much, driven by the incentives of 34 Above the large credit spreads and larger pay-offs make the debt to asset ratio rise, moving the ωt toward another steady state, which is roughly at ω * * = −3.8 35 Note that we do not pursue the issue here at what leverage ratio bankruptcy would occur. This depends on the distance to default, which is defined by the KMV model by the distance of the asset value of the bank to the debt, divided by the standard deviation (volatility) of the asset value. We are not pursuing this question here, since we do not explicitly computing the asset value of the financial intermediary. This is issue is pursued in Gruene and Semmler (2005) . 36 Since the the shape of the value function for this case is similar to the next case, it will be discussed in sect. 3.3. They thus state that limiting payouts should be welfare improving. More explicitly they say:
"We would like to argue that a regulator can improve social welfare by a policy that limits bonus payments within the financial sector. Specifically, suppose that experts are not allowed to pay themselves as long financial intermediaries are not sufficiently capitalized" (BS, 2010: 32) . This type of regulatory effort would keep sufficient capital within the banking system and make it more stable. 37 This conjecture can also be shown to hold using our DP solution algorithm. In order to explore this variant with time varying credit spreads and tighter payouts, we, as before, allow for negative and positive growth rates of the assets purchased by the financial intermediaries to be in the range−0.1 < g t < 0.1, but we constrain the consumption to capital ratio by 0.01 <c t < 0.05.
Again, the latter is always positive but it is constrained not to be too large. Under the condition that the growth rate of assets and the consumption rate can be chosen optimally, yet payouts will be constrained to be low. Figure 2 shows the dynamics where the domain of attraction is increased, the steady state is now roughly at ω * = −3.9, which is also repeller: with lower leverage and low payouts, the debt to 37 A similar view is present in the Geneva Report (2009, sect. 6.2 ) and Basel III. asset ratio will go to zero. The domain of attraction of the zero debt to asset ratio is considerable enlarged. The dangers of large externalities, financial stress and meltdowns are reduced. 38 So, now a high debt to asset ratio can be stabilized if risk premia and payouts are small.
As to our Figure 2 , the shock dZ t moves the trajectories, along the vertical axis, whereas the debt dynamics with credit spread moves the trajectories along the axis ω. Note that we have here now the shock drawn from the range −0.1 < dZ t < 0.1, and we have used −10 < ω t < 0. For our third dimension, our time index x t , the range is defined as 0 < t < 100. But because we have a movement in a three dimensional space, the time axis, the third variable, the one that goes to the back, is fixed. We are showing here the projection of the trajectories to a 2 dimension space. Figure 3 shows the corresponding value function, revealing the result that total welfare (for the financial intermediaries) is rising with lower debt to asset ratio. 39 Overall, the risk premium, and thus the credit spread, is, in our two variants, made state-and time-dependent. The state dependent credit spread is likely to trigger a vicious cycle. If the spread goes to zero interest rates tend to reflect the short term interest rate set by the central 38 There appears that an initial debt to asset ratio below that new threshold ω * = −3.9, with low payouts, and time varying risk premia, will produce always stability. 39 The rise of the value function to the right of the steady state is reasonable, since the welfare from lower credit spread should be higher. It was computed through our numerical solution procedure. The value function for the case of Section 3.2. was similar to the case above. It also increased with the debt to asset ratio falling, i.e., the value function to the right of ω=-0.85 in Figure 1 was rising. Note that the shape of the value functions in the cases of Section 3.3. as well as 3.2. are roughly the same as shown in BS (2010) in their Figure 7 , though we have negative values on the vertical axis, since we are taking logct, notct, in the preferences.
bank. 40 For the state-dependent credit spread and relatively larger payouts, we can observe that for a leverage beyond a threshold, the leverage will finally be built up quickly through a vicious cycle, 41 and for small payouts and time-dependent credit spread there is a much larger domain of the zero attractor of the debt to asset ratio. Thus, larger shocks are likely not to matter as much as in the first case.
The downward instability and depends not only on the financial stress (and thus the size of the risk premia), 42 but also on the constraints of payouts: With high payouts, the high leverage equilibrium can become an attractor, whereas with tighter constraints and low payouts the zero level leveraging can become the attractor for a large domain of attraction. 43 
Financial Stress and Output Measures
Given our model variants with smaller and larger domains of attraction, a study of the study of the range of instability-or stability-is an important empirical issue to be explored next. Yet, what measures can one utilize to empirically evaluate the predictions of the model and to conduct empirical estimates. One issue is to measure the financial stress of banks, and the other linkages of the banking-macro feedback. Note that our model variants above, may suggest to take leverage ratios as measure triggering banking instability: So high leverage implying high financial stress and low leverage the reverse.
However, there is an issue whether the ratio of net worth to capital assets, or the reverse measure, the leveraging ω, can be used as good measure of financial stress. This measure is greatly affected by the market valuation of assets as well as liabilities. In particular, asset valuation is heavily impacted by the confidence and estimate of income streams the asset generates, as well as presumed discount rates, and the liabilities such as bonds or short and long term loans are strongly affected by their corresponding risk premia. 44 Moreover, credit constraints, for example, 40 A low borrowing interest rate for the banks, according to the argument by BS (2010, Section 4), may arise, if they can transfer risk through the securitization of loans and selling them as CDOs to a secondary risk market, see Semmler and Bernard (2012) . This will not only reduce their risk exposure, but also give them less incentives for monitoring loans and increase leveraging and thus increase systemic risk: if idiosyncratic shocks are fully hedged out through securitization, the financial intermediaries then "face the cost of borrowing of only r ... Lower cost of borrowing leads to higher leverage and quicker payouts. As a result the system becomes less stable". (BS, 2010:39). They further argue that though in principle securitization may be good, since it allows for sharing of idiosyncratic risk, it also leads to the creation of severe leverage and the amplification of systemic risk. 41 This situation creates a vicious circle of credit spreads and higher indebtedness, as often has been observed for companies, households as well as for sovereign debt, fir example for Greece and Italy in 2011.
42 BS (2010) show that the high leverage can be become a tipping point for the instability and the downward movement. 43 Yet, when and to what extent some exogenous risk is turned into endogenous risk, leading to a higher risk premium and discount rate, for all, may also, as BS (2011: 4) show, depend on the extent that the financial intermediaries are able to transfer risk. Large risk transfer might then show up, at least temporarily, as lower risk premia and credit spread for financial intermediaries.
44 This is implicit in Merton's risk structure of interest rates, see Merton (1974) as measured by the Fed index of changes in credit standards to determine the ease and tightness of obtaining credit as well as default premia and credit spreads and short term liquidity, are also important financial stress factors for financial intermediaries. All this will affect credit demand and supply of financial intermediaries. We thus need more extensive measures than only leverage to evaluate financial stress.
In contrast, as mentioned above, we propose to measure financial stress empirically by taking the IMF´s (2011) financial stress index, the FSI. This is available for a large number of EU countries. 45 The IMF's (2011) FSI 46 refers to three major sources and measures of instability, namely: 1) a bank related index -a banking beta as 12-month rolling beta of bank stock index and a Ted or interbank spread, 2) a security related index -a corporate bond yield spread, an inverted term spread, and a monthly stock returns (measured as declines), six-month rolling monthly squared stock returns and finally, 3) an exchange rate index -a six-month rolling monthly squared change in real exchange rates. All three sets of variables are detrended and scaled with their standard deviations in order to normalize the measures.
As measure for the performance of the macroeconomy we take a monthly production index for the different countries, or what is more proper in the context of our model, the growth rate of the monthly production index of the various countries we are considering.
As concerning the IMF FSI, combining the three groups of variables with appropriate weight in a stress index and contrasting it with the monthly production index, one can observe clearly a counter-cyclical behavior. This is illustrated in Figure 4 , where the variables are shown for a three-month moving average.
As the comparison of the smoothed growth rate of the production index and the stress index in Figure 4 show there is less financial stress in good times, but more in bad times. Financial intermediaries are clearly doing better in economic booms than in recessions 47 . Given the apparent 45 As noted the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and the Fed St. Louis have also developed a general financial stress index, called KCFSI and STLFSI respectively. The KCFSI and the STLFSI, take into account the various factors generating financial stress. The KC index is a monthly index, the STL index a weekly index, to capture more short run movements, see also Hatzius et al (2010) . Those factors can be taken as substitutes for the net worth or leverage ratios as measuring financial stress of financial intermediaries. See also the Bank of Canada index for Canada, i.e. Illing and Lui (2006) . Both the KCFSI and STLFSI include a number of variables and financial stress is related to an: 1) increase the uncertainty of the fundamental value of the assets, often resulting in higher volatility of the asset prices, 2) increase uncertainty about the behavior of the other investors, 3) increase the asymmetry in information, 4) increase the flight to quality, 5) decrease the willingness to hold risky assets, and 6) decrease the willingness to hold illiquid assets. The principle component analysis is then used to obtain the FSI. Linear OLS coefficients are normalized through their standard deviations and their relative weights computed to explain an FSI index. A similar procedure is used by Adrian and Shin (2010) to compute a macro economic risk premium. We want to note that most of the variables used are highly correlated with credits spread variables. They also have the highest weight in the index, for details see Hakkio and Keeton (2009, tables 2-3.).
46 This is published for advanced as well for developing countries, see IMF (2008) and IMF FSI (2011) 47 This coincides also with the empirical study by that there is more insolvency of financial institutions in bad times. linkages between the FSI and economic activity, we would also expect a strong linkage between net worth, or leveraging, of financial intermediaries and economic activity, since the financial stress is affecting the balance sheets of financial intermediaries. 48 A "one-regime VAR" has been used frequently to study the financial accelerator. 49 Yet those "oneregime VAR" studies presume only local behavior of the variables, symmetry effects of shocks and mean reversion after the shocks. What we will pursue here is an MRVAR. Our MRVAR analysis 50 takes the IMF FSI as empirical measure of financial stress, and the growth rate of the monthly production index-the latter is also used as a threshold variable to define growth regimes for a selected EU countries.
Empirical MRVAR Analysis
To empirically examine whether or not local instabilities are present and, if so, to assess their consequences, we require a modeling framework that can accommodate varying dynamic patterns across alternative states of the economy. The multi-regime vector autoregression (MRVAR) approach we adopt permits us to detect the presence of multiple regimes and to investigate regime-dependence in the responses to shocks to the system. Shocks might occur during a 48 We want to note that the financial stress index can also be linked to some broader index of economic activity, See Hakkio and Keeton (2009) see Hakkio and Keeton (2009) .
49 Estimating the financial accelerator for the macroeconomy with a "one regime VAR", see Christensen and Dib (2008) . For the application of the financial accelerator to study financial intermediaries in a "one regime VAR", see Hakkio regime with great instability, as, for example, in the case of a high steady-state leverage ratio (or high stress) discussed in Section 3 (see Figure 1 ) the effects will be larger as compared to a regime with a large domain of attraction for the zero leverage ratio (and low stress), see Figure   2 . As a consequence, responses to positive and negative shocks may have different effects, as may variations in the size of the shocks.
We estimate MRVAR models for six countries: the EU countries Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and the UK as well as the U.S. We will discuss the results for Germany in some detail those for the other countries are graphically summarized in Appendix 3 and discussed briefly below.
MRVAR Approach
To assess the dependence of the responses to shocks to the stress index, we employ an MRVAR approach. A major limitation of conventional linear VAR models is that shock responses are independent of the state of the economy at the time a shock occurs. Also, VAR response profiles are invariant with respect to the sign and size of a shock. That is, responses to positive and negative shocks are mirror images; and responses to shocks of different sizes are simply scaled versions of the response to a shock of size one. To capture state dependencies and asymmetries of shock responses, a nonlinear model needs to be specified. The "mildest" form of generalizing a linear, constant-parameter VAR is to adopt a piecewise linear VAR, such as Markov-switching autoregressions (Hamilton, 1989) or threshold autoregressions (Tong, 1978 (Tong, , 1983 . A characteristic of Markov-switching autoregressions is that the states are unobservable and, hence, do not necessarily have an obvious interpretation. Also, a given observation cannot directly be associated with any particular regime. Only conditional probabilistic assignments are possible via statistical inference based on past information.
For our purposes, namely state-dependent response analysis, states are associated with specific stages of the business cycle as measured, for example, in terms of output growth. MRVAR models in the form of threshold autoregression models of Tong (1978 Tong ( , 1983 or, in a vector setting, of multivariate threshold autoregressions (Tsay, 1998) are obvious candidates. In contrast to Markov-switching autoregressions or standard multivariate threshold autoregressions, our approach assumes that we can, based on some observable variable, define upfront a meaningful set of regimes, which are not a result of some estimation procedure, but rather motivated by the objective of the empirical analysis. This is preferable in our setting, where we are interested in evaluating the potential effectiveness of policy measures for specific states of the economy.
The MRVAR specification adopted here is given by
where r t−d is the value of the threshold variable observed at time t − d; and regimes are defined by the (prespecified) threshold levels −∞ = τ 0 < τ 1 < · · · < τ M = ∞. In the following analysis we estimate a two-regime VAR, with the output-growth rate as the threshold variable, and the average growth rate defining the threshold for the sample.
In addition to the more straightforward regime interpretation, MRVAR models are also more appealing than Markov-switching autoregressions as far as estimation is concerned. Rather than EM-estimation, MRVARs with predefined threshold levels resemble conventional VARs and can be estimated regime by regime, using common least-squares or Bayesian techniques.
Response analysis for linear VAR models is straightforward. Point estimates and asymptotic distributions of shock response can be derived analytically from the estimated VAR parameters (see Mittnik and Zadrozny, 1993) . In nonlinear settings, this is, in general, not possible, and one has to resort to Monte Carlo simulations. Following Koop et al. (1996) , the so-called generalized impulse responses, which depend on the overall state, z t , the type of shock, v t , and the response horizon, h, are defined by
where the overall state, z t , reflects the relevant information set. For a Markov-switching VAR process, z t comprises information about the past realizations of y t and the states; for an MRVAR process with known threshold levels, only information about past realizations y t−1 , · · · , y t−p max ,
To understand the differences in the dynamic characteristics between the different regimes, regime-specific response analysis as in Ehrmann et al. (2003) is helpful. MRVAR models assume that the process remains within a specific regime during the next h periods. This is reasonable when regimes tend to persist or when we are interested in short-term analysis and, particularly, helps to understand regime-specific dynamics.
Estimation
For our bivariate analysis of the six countries we use monthly data on industrial production (IP) and the IMF's Financial Stress Index (FSI) covering more or less the period from mid 1981 to mid 2011. 51 Below, we focus on the results for Germany. The results for the other countries are detailed in Appendix 3.
We estimate a standard VAR and an MRVAR model for the IP-growth rate and absolute changes in FSI, and define y t = (100∆ log IP t , ∆F SI t , ) . We use the AIC for model selection. For MRVAR model (12) , the AIC is given by
where M is the number of regimes; p j is the autoregressive order of Regime j; T j reflects the number of observations associated with Regime j;Σ j is the estimated residual covariance matrix for Regime j; and n denotes the number of variables in vector y t . Formulation (13) The model specifications for Germany as well as the other five countries are summarized in Table 2 . For all countries, the AIC strongly favors the MRVAR model over the conventional, one-regime VAR. The mean of the six VAR-AICs is 458.4 and substantially exceeds that of the MRVAR-AIC average of 188.9.
Response Analysis for Germany
To assess the effects of linear versus nonlinear model specification, we first look at the estimates of the cumulative unit-shock responses for the VAR model and the regime-specific responses for the MRVAR model. To derive structural responses, we assume that a shock to IP simultaneously affects the FSI, whereas IP reacts with a one-period delay to an FSI shock. The cumulative responses due to a unit shock implied by the estimated VAR model are shown in Figure 5 . 53
The results for the conventional VAR model ( Figure 5 ) suggests that a positive one-standarddeviation stress shock has an increasingly negative cumulative IP-growth effect which settles at -0.37% after about seven months. The cumulative response of IP to a unit shock in IP itself 52 When employing (13) to discriminate between an MRVAR and a standard VAR specification (i.e., a oneregime MRVAR), we need to include the n parameters in the intercept vector, c, and the n(n + 1)/2 parameters in the residual covariance matrix for an equivalent parameter count. 53 In the following initial discussion discussion of the general results for the response analysis we, first, focus solely on the responses' point-estimates. We will consider interval estimates when we discuss the results specific to the question under investigation. settles at 1.16%; and the stress index responds positively to a positive IP shock (0.19%), but more so to a positive FSI shock itself (0.65%).
Next, we explore the MRVAR within-regime response behavior. Clearly, the assumption to stay within a particular regime for an extended period is not very realistic as shocks and regime dynamics may induce regime migration. Also, by looking at the within-regime dynamics, we solely focus on the regime-specific autoregressive parameters and ignore the level effects resulting from differences in the regime intercepts. Any differences in the regimes' intercepts will induce additional variation in the overall dynamics when the process switches between regimes. However, a regime-specific response analysis is useful as it helps to better understand the short-term dynamics associated with the estimated regimes.
The within-regime MRVAR responses are presented in MRVAR in Figure 6 . Here, the cumulative responses to unit shocks implied by each of the two MRVAR regimes are somewhat different.
Within the high IP-growth regime (upper half in Figure 6 ) a positive one-standard-deviation stress shock has practically no impact on IP (-0.02%). Compared to the VAR analysis, IP responds less positively to a unit shock in IP itself, settling at 0.71% rather than unity. The stress index responds somewhat higher to a positive IP shock (0.33%); and the cumulative MRVAR response to a positive FSI shock with 0.74% versus 0.65% is marginally higher than the VAR-implied. Within the low IP-growth regime (lower half in Figure 6 ) a stress shock has a weak negative impact on IP (-0.17%). With 1.82%, the IP response to positive shock in IP is much stronger than in the high-growth regime or the VAR-implied case. The stress index hardly reacts an IP shock (0.07%); and, with 0.70%, the response to an FSI corresponds to that obtained for the high-growth regime.
Given our objective, namely the evaluation of the impact of banking-sector stress on economic to shocks to the financial stress index. In order to investigate the economy's overall growth effects due to FSI shocks we, first, simulate generalized cumulative response functions to unitimpulse shocks. We do this for specific states at which the shock is assumed to occur. The two specific states we select are the sample averages observed for each of the two regimes, as they can be viewed as representatives for low-and high-growth states of the economy. The low-growth regime mean isȳ low = (−1.0542, −0.0216) , and that for high-growthȳ high = (1.2834, 0.0051) .
From these we simulate both a positive and a negative unit-shock to the stress-index. The mean cumulative responses to IP together with one-standard deviation confidence bands are shown in Figure 7 .
The estimated unit-shock responses strongly suggest that the impact of an FSI shock on output varies with the state of the economy. A positive unit-shock in the average high-growth state (top left plot in Figure 7 ) causes IP to drop by about -1.9% after two years. However, only for the first-month response does the confidence band border the zero line, indicating some significance.
The same shock applied in the average low-growth state (bottom left plot), results in an IP contraction, which is twice as large (-0.41%). This result possesses more significance, as the confidence band excludes the zero line for 12 months. Thus, in a recession period an increase in financial stress curbs German IP more severely than during a boom.
If the same FSI-unit-shock is negative, we obtain pretty much the reverse results. In absolute terms, a negative FSI shock during low growth (bottom right plot) has a stronger impact than Finally, the left panel in Figure 8 indicates that IP responses are more or less size-proportional and symmetric with respect to the sign of FSI shocks.
The response properties our findings suggest appear particularly relevant for policy action. Monetary policy shocks-in particular what has recently been called unconventional monetary pol-icy 54 -are more likely to be effective when the shocks are sufficiently large and applied during low-growth regimes.
Our empirical MRVAR results strongly suggest that the timing of policy actions affecting financial stress is very influential on the success of such measures. The findings are compatible with recent studies which argue that unconventional monetary policy is needed in a depressed economy that is accompanied by a sharp rise in credit spreads, which, more so than asset-price volatility, constitute the dominant component of the stress index. 55 The results suggest that not only a decrease in the interest rate but also a reduction in financial stress and in credit spreads are required to induce significant expansionary effects.
Response Analysis for Selected EU Countries and the U.S.
With a look on the smoothed FSI and IP plots as well as our MRVAR response analysis, we now briefly elaborate on the empirical findings for the countries under investigation. 56 Altogether, the response analyses for these countries suggest that there are certain common patterns but also some country-specific differences. We summarize the results as follows.
Common Features
1. Regime Effects: Shocks the financial-stress index have asymmetric effects and are regime dependent, with positive and negative shocks of the same size resulting in different effectsan exception is the UK. A reduction of financial stress (negative shock) in the low-growth regime has a stronger effect on output than in the high-growth regime.
2. Shock-size effects: Small shocks often show small effects, and large shocks produce overproportionally effects. This points to some corridor stability: given small shocks the process is more likely to stay in the present regime; in the presence of large shock it is more likely to switch the regime and, thus less likely to revert. Thus, in the low-growth regime, large shocks (i.e., a large stress reduction) is required to sizeably affect output. This holds for most countries under investiation, with the UK being again the exception.
Country Heterogeneity
We observe quite some heterogeneity between countries as to the way how negative or positive proportional effects relative to small shocks. There are, however, over-proportional effects of positive and negative shocks in low growth; and the reduction of stress in the lowgrowth regime is considerably more effective given large shocks. This could be attributable to the fact that Germany has a strong manufacturing sector, which is more resilient to variations in financial stress. In a low-growth regime, German output is more sensitive to financial stress. However, large negative stress shocks have a more sizeable positive impact on output than positive shocks reduce output. Overall, the MRVAR impulse-response behavior is similar to the U.S. There are effects during low growth, but these are pretty much sign-symmetric. Overall, Spain's real economy seems to be more decoupled from financial stress than is the case in most other economies. 58 5. Surprisingly different results are obtained for the UK. During the 2007-08 crisis it shows as big a rise in financial stress as the U.S. and a fall in output as Germany and Italy, roughly 2 %. However, the MRVAR analysis for the UK shows for either growth regime little output sensitivities with respect to (negative or positive) financial shocks. This could be due to the facts that UK's financial market is large relative to GDP, that it experiences contagion effects from the U.S., and that the real economy (manufacturing) is relatively decoupled from the financial sector. Since its actual manufacturing base, measured by industrial production over GDP has become relatively small, 59 but its export share to the EU is 57%. The UK, therefore, has suffered from spillover effects from the Euro Area crisis.
6. The U.S. has had the strongest rise in FSI and a substantial fall in IP during the meltdown.
The response analysis shows very strong effects during low growth, where positive shocks decrease output markedly. Positive shocks in a high-growth regime also reduce output sharply. U.S. output responds rather sensitively to financial shocks and does so especially to stress reduction in low-growth states. The link between the banking sector and output seems to be rather strong in the U.S.
Overall, the empirical analysis may suggest that the stronger the position of an economy in the world economy in terms of its GDP and share of world trade, the more autonomous are the financial stress effects, having direct impact on their economies. Moreover, in these economies, a large stress reduction in a low growth regimes have a relatively more sizeable improvement on output. Yet the smaller the economies are, the more they are dependent on the external dynamics and the spillover effects, which seem to significantly affect the consequences of their own financial stress shocks. Moreover, as in the case of France, a larger public sector seems to act as a buffer against (positive and negative) stress shocks-possibly, as compared to Germany, at the expense of long-term growth.
Conclusions
Although, historically, most severe economic crises have led to a meltdown of the banking sector, the banking sector has usually exacerbated and amplified crises, regardless of their origin. To investigate those feedback effects, we have studied the linkage between financial stress, credit spreads and economic growth. In particular, we studied the question of the banking sector's instability, being exposed to asset-price shocks, credit-spread shocks and financial stress in general. We modeled financial intermediaries as a wealth fund, which accumulates capital assets, heavily borrow and grants generous payouts. When the banking sector is exposed to a deterioration of its balances sheets, it turns out that varying credit spreads and payouts play an 59 UK's industrial production is roughly 11% of GDP.
important role for the dynamics of the leverage ratio, the financial stress and the domain of attraction of the stable steady state. Greater credit spreads, larger payout and larger adverse shocks beyond some threshold, may induce instabilities, whereas smaller adverse shocks may not affect mean-reversion.
In contrast to previous studies that use the financial accelerator-which is locally amplifying but globally stable and mean reverting-our model admits downward instability as predicted in BS (2010). Whereas the financial accelerator leads, in terms of econometrics, to a single-regime VAR specification, the multi-regime dynamics studied here requires a multi-regime VAR (MRVAR) approach. Using the IMF (2011) financial stress index and growth regimes, our method of a MRVAR-based study enables us to conduct growth-regime specific response analysis.
Empirically, we find that financial-stress shocks have asymmetric effects, depending on the regime the economy is in. We also show that the effects of the shocks are dependent on the size of the shocks. 60 Although there is quite some heterogeneity between countries in the sense that output responses to stres-shocks are larger in the bigger economies (for example Germany and the U.S.), there are also common features: Large positive financial stress shocks in a high growth regime tend to have less of a contractionary effect than in a recession; and large reductions tends to induce stronger expansionary effects in low-rather than in high-growth regimes.
The latter seems important when evaluating "unconventional" monetary policy. The empirical analysis presented here strongly suggests that both timing and the intensity of policy actions matter-findings that cannot be obtained by conventional, linear, single-regime analysis.
the algorithm is applied to discounted infinite horizon dynamic decision problems of the type introduced for the study of our search and matching models. In our model variants we have to numerically compute V (x):
where u represents the decision variable, and x a vector of state variables. Note that one of the components of the vector of state variables, for example x i , could represent the time index x, as used in sect 2.2.
In the first step, the continuous time optimal decision problem has to be replaced by a first order discrete time approximation given by
where
, and x h is defined by the discrete dynamics
and h > 0 is the discretization time step. Note that U denotes the set of discrete control
The value function is the unique solution of a discrete Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation such
where x h (1) = x + hg(x, u) denotes the discrete solution corresponding to the control and initial value x after one time step h. Using the operator
the second step of the algorithm now approximates the solution on a grid Γ covering a compact subset of the state space, i.e. a compact interval [0, K] in our setup. Denoting the nodes of Γ by
x i with i = 1, ..., P , we are now looking for an approximation V Γ h satisfying
for each node x i of the grid, where the value of V Γ h for points x which are not grid points (these are needed for the evaluation of T h ) is determined by linear interpolation. We refer to Gruene and Semmler (2004) for the description of iterative methods for the solution of (15) . This procedure allows then the numerical computation of approximately optimal trajectories.
In order to distribute the nodes of the grid efficiently, we make use of an a posteriori error estimation. For each cell C l of the grid Γ we compute
More precisely, we approximate this value by evaluating the right hand side in a number of test points. It can be shown that the error estimators η l give upper and lower bounds for the real error (i.e., the difference between V j and V Γ h ) and hence serve as an indicator for a possible local refinement of the grid Γ. It should be noted that this adaptive refinement of the grid is particularly effective for computing steep value functions, non-differential value functions and models with multiple equilibria, see Gruene et al. (2004) and Gruene and Semmler (2004) . These are all cases where local linearizations are not sufficiently informative.
Appendix 2: Estimating Movements of Credit Spreads
We take the IMF's (2011) FSI as a proxy of the time varying default risk and credit cost. We apply the Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) to the IMF (2011) FSI for Germany. 61 The time period is from February 1980 to October 2011 at monthly frequency.
When we apply the FFT for Germany we estimate the periodic components of the actual time series. The estimates of the coefficients are reported in table 3, and the results are then illustrated in Figure A1 . We estimate a linear combination of sine-cos functions, representing the low frequency components of the actual time series, which then can be used as input into our DP described in Appendix 1. The form of our estimate is
with the coefficients given in Table 3 below. Figure A1 plots the actual and fitted series. 
